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Turkey’s Middle East Dream

The New Middle East Order: Turkey’s Risky Ambition

18 November 2026 11 min read
Through the Mecca Defense Alliance and expanding its influence in Syria, Turkey aspires to lead the Middle East; however, competition with Iran and Israel and the emergence of rival blocs have made Ankara’s ambition costly.
The New Middle East Order: Turkey’s Risky Ambition

Zaviye Institute—Exclusive Translation: Since Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the future of the Middle East has been the subject of intense debate and controversy. The previous order, centered on the Persian Gulf, had placed Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates at the forefront of efforts to create stability and shape the region through economic policy and the normalization of relations with former adversaries in Iran, Israel, Turkey and Syria. Three years of war in Gaza, and more recently in Iran and the Persian Gulf, have severely disrupted this project of order-building and created a profound sense of uncertainty about what will happen next.

Turkey, like every other major power in the Middle East, has sought to fill this vacuum. Before 2023, Ankara’s influence was waning; after years of diplomatic isolation following the Arab uprisings, it had only just begun repairing its relations with the region’s principal actors. Over the past several years, however, Turkey has won U.S. support because of its policies in Syria and its regional diplomacy, while seeking to secure its domestic front by pursuing a peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a militant group that has waged an insurgency against the Turkish state for decades. More recently, in August, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey signed the Makkah Defense Alliance, a collective security agreement that institutionalizes Turkey’s regional position and draws the country directly into Saudi Arabia’s war with the Houthis.

Turkey’s strategy since October 7 has revived its position as a regional heavyweight. But it is unable to achieve its larger objective: creating an order on its own terms. Like other aspiring regional leaders, Turkey lacks the power to impose a new security framework by itself. Its nascent efforts to create such a framework, such as the new Makkah pact, merely make countries outside the bloc feel insecure and intensify instability. Turkey’s most ambitious efforts at regional leadership are therefore likely to prove ineffective or even counterproductive. As long as the Middle East’s security dynamics remain heavily militarized and zero-sum, Ankara would do better to focus on interests closer to home that it has the power to protect.

Read more: Can Turkey Become the New Architect of Regional Security?

Risk and Reward

This is not the first time Turkey has sought to shape a broader Middle Eastern order. Ankara viewed the Arab uprisings in the early 2010s as a historic opportunity. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) described the political transformation sweeping the region as “the rise to power of the people,” and the Turkish government expected that the eventual elections in Arab countries shaken by protests would bring to power Muslim Brotherhood-aligned parties that were ideologically sympathetic and had practical ties to the AKP. The thinking was that the emergence of friendly governments would increase Turkey’s influence in the region.

Those hopes, however, quickly faded. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated president, Mohamed Morsi, was overthrown in 2013, and Turkey’s bet on the opposition movement in Syria failed as Bashar al-Assad clung to power. Turkey became isolated. A rival axis comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates objected to Turkey’s relations with the Muslim Brotherhood and sought to constrain Ankara’s influence. This grouping challenged Turkey’s positions across the Middle East, North Africa, the eastern Mediterranean and the Horn of Africa, and effectively fought proxy wars with Turkey in the conflicts in Libya, Somalia and Syria.

Then the October 7, 2023 attacks ushered in another period of upheaval. Since then, some developments have worked in Turkey’s favor. The most important was the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024 at the hands of opposition groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Turkey had arguably invested more than any other country in regime change in Damascus; it had supported opposition groups for years. Yet as the years passed, this objective increasingly appeared out of reach. Other major regional powers reconciled themselves to the regime’s survival, and even Ankara began exploring the establishment of cordial relations with Assad in order to avoid being sidelined. Assad’s fall transformed Turkey’s fortunes overnight, giving it a level of influence in Syria that it had lacked for more than a decade.

Turkey’s efforts to normalize regional relations have produced mixed results.

These developments have become more dangerous for Ankara than before. Israel’s foreign policy became more decisive and revisionist after October 7, and its broad security objectives came into conflict with those of Turkey. Strong criticism by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Israel’s policies in Gaza strained relations, and ties deteriorated further when Turkey expanded its foothold in post-Assad Syria and Israel viewed Ankara’s military presence there as a direct threat. As Israel’s attacks on positions in Syria continue—attacks that Ankara has condemned—the risk of escalation is only increasing. A miscalculation by either side could lead to direct clashes between Israeli and Turkish forces.

Meanwhile, the US-Israeli war with Iran has been a lose-lose proposition for Turkey. While Tehran’s attention has been focused elsewhere, Ankara has welcomed Iran’s withdrawal from Syria and the opportunity to counter its remaining influence in Iraq. Turkey also has no interest in a nuclear-armed Iran upsetting the regional balance of power. However, the prospect of chaos along Turkey’s eastern border in the event of the Iranian regime’s collapse has generated real anxiety in Ankara, as has the possibility that Iran could emerge emboldened if the regime survives the war intact.

In this complex environment, Ankara has pursued a three-pronged strategy to protect its security interests and hopes to capitalize on the opportunities created by these developments. Since US President Donald Trump returned to power, Erdoğan has moved Turkey closer to the United States and sought to use his relationship with Washington to advance Ankara’s regional policies. Turkey has also continued regional normalization efforts, seeking to repair relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other key Arab states in the early 2020s, with the aim of building a broader regional bloc. And domestically, Ankara launched the “Turkey without Terror” process, an effort to resolve the conflict with the PKK inside and outside Turkey, which Turkey’s adversaries have long exploited by arming Kurdish groups or providing them with political support.

Read more: About Turkey’s future in the Middle East

Falling Short

Some of Ankara’s policies have borne fruit. Consider, for example, its rapprochement with Washington. Erdoğan’s close relationship with Trump helped secure US support for Turkey’s expanded role in Syria. Turkey was one of four countries Washington enlisted to help negotiate the US-proposed October 2025 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, and as a result, Trump proposed—and Erdoğan accepted—a seat on the Gaza Reconstruction Board of Peace established by the US president. Turkey played an active role in mediating between the United States and Iran during the recent war. And Trump publicly backed the Mecca Defense Alliance, calling it “big, bold and important.” All of this points to Washington’s recognition of Turkey’s regional importance, the US government’s willingness to support some of Ankara’s priorities, and Turkey’s determination to elevate its standing.

However, there are undeniable limits to Turkey’s efforts to exert influence. For example, at the February 2026 summit of the Board of Peace, Turkey was excluded from participating in the planned deployment of international forces and police training in Gaza—a sign that warming relations with Washington had not been sufficient to overcome Israeli objections to Turkey’s military presence in the Palestinian territories. In Syria, similarly, the support Turkey received from the Trump administration has not prevented Israeli military strikes against Syrian targets near Turkish positions. Put simply, Turkey has been unable to use its relationship with the Trump administration to overcome the constraint that Israel’s opponents place on the scope of Turkey’s regional role.

Ankara has the greatest influence when it stays out of Middle Eastern conflicts.

Turkey’s efforts to normalize regional relations have also produced mixed results. Certainly, reviving diplomatic relations with important actors such as Saudi Arabia benefits Turkey. But the alliances Ankara is forging with these countries expose Turkey and the region to the risk of becoming less, rather than more, secure. The Mecca pact with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia could ultimately lead to the hardening of rival blocs and heightened regional tensions. Turkey insists that the alliance is directed against no particular country and has suggested that Egypt, Syria or even Iran could eventually join it. But at the same time, Iran, Israel and the Houthis could view it as a threat and seek to test or undermine the commitment of its members.

Moreover, this pact could draw Turkey into the wars of other countries. This possibility is now being raised as the Turkish parliament has ratified the agreement and the Houthis are intensifying their attacks on Saudi Arabia. The Turkish government has insisted that any military support it provides will be limited to deterrence, intelligence-sharing and defence-industrial cooperation. However, Saudi Arabia is now seeking assistance from Pakistan and Turkey in air defence and territorial protection, and the three countries have agreed to prepare forces for rapid deployment. The deployment of Turkish forces to Saudi Arabia would still require separate parliamentary approval. If parliament authorises it, even a limited deployment would carry the risk of pulling Turkey into a broader regional conflict.

Some form of regional security framework is essential. The problem is that no country in the region, including Turkey, has the power to impose a security order on the others, so whenever anyone attempts to do so, the other countries feel threatened. An informal cooperative framework open to all countries in the region—and requiring its members to commit to non-aggression rather than mutual defence—might work better. But establishing and operating such an alliance requires a degree of trust that the region’s governments do not possess. Breaking this deadlock would probably require the United States to play a more constructive role than it has in recent years—not merely endorsing whatever regional arrangement emerges, as Trump did with the Mecca Pact, or pressuring countries to normalise relations with Israel without expecting any change in Israeli policies in return, as Trump has also done. Instead, Washington, perhaps with Beijing’s assistance, should compel regional rivals such as Iran and Saudi Arabia to undertake confidence-building measures that would make an inclusive security framework viable over the long term. Without this external pressure, the narrower security blocs emerging in the region will only lead to greater instability.

Play to Your Strengths

Ankara’s strongest cards lie in Turkey’s immediate neighbourhood. The peace process with the Kurds has proceeded slowly since February ۲۰۲۵, when Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK, called on the militant group to disarm. But tangible progress has been made. In May ۲۰۲۵, the PKK announced that it would dissolve. In Syria, Kurdish forces are being integrated into the Syrian army, and Mazloum Abdi, commander of the People’s Protection Units, a Kurdish armed group affiliated with the PKK, was appointed as an adviser to the president in August. Syria’s post-war transition remains fragile, and reconciliation between Damascus and the Kurdish militants in the northeast may owe as much to US pressure as to Turkey’s domestic efforts to make peace with the PKK. But for Turkey, the eventual integration of Syria’s Kurdish forces into the Syrian state would eliminate the danger Ankara saw in having an independent, armed Kurdish entity on its southern border. And given the close security and economic ties Ankara has established with Damascus, as well as the political and legal steps the government can take at home to complete the dissolution of the PKK and deepen democratic reforms, Turkey is capable of sustaining these encouraging developments.

Turkey’s regional policies are most successful when the country leverages its strengths—not when it seeks to impose its influence across the region. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Ankara built genuine influence by mediating between Syria and Israel and between Palestinian factions, expanding its economic engagement across the Levant, and proposing projects to connect the region’s energy and transport infrastructure. Meanwhile, military power has been most effective when deployed for specific purposes, such as securing the border with Syria. This combination is Turkey’s winning formula: diplomacy and economic development to expand its influence, and limited force to protect its core interests. By contrast, broad and open-ended commitments risk drawing Turkey into regional conflicts without enhancing its security.

Read more: Turkey on the Path to Redefining its Regional Policies

Today, adhering to a more effective formula does not mean retreating from regional policies. Rather, it means setting priorities and planning for the long term. Consolidating the peace process with the Kurds, maintaining Washington’s investment in stability in Syria, managing the risk of confrontation with Israel in Syria, and maintaining constructive relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq and the Iraqi government in Baghdad are key to safeguarding Turkey’s borders and are within Turkey’s capacity to achieve. Ankara can continue to draw on its experience in mediation when opportunities arise to advance peace processes. It can also promote economic connectivity by expanding trade relations and supporting regional infrastructure projects such as the Iraq–Europe Development Road and the proposed pipeline network connecting the Persian Gulf to Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. If it can act without making formal commitments, there is also no need to avoid security cooperation with the Gulf. In all these efforts, however, Ankara should remember that it has the greatest influence when it stays out of regional conflicts.

The intensifying wars and rival blocs in the Middle East may make it more difficult today than in the past to maintain Turkey’s more limited security policy. Defending Ankara’s interests and playing a constructive role in an unstable region requires a delicate balance. The best way Turkey can contribute to regional stability may be to avoid trying to do too much.

Source: Foreign Affairs

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Cite this analysis

Meliha Benli Altunışık (November 2026). «The New Middle East Order: Turkey’s Risky Ambition». Zaviye Strategic Studies Institute. https://zaviyeinsight.com/en/2026/11/18/new-middle-east-order-turkey-risky-ambition/

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