Syria and the Mecca Alliance: Why Should Damascus Not Join This Pact? Copy title
Syria Should Not Join the Mecca Alliance; It Should Cooperate with It.

Zaviye Institute: Debate over Syria and the Makkah alliance has become one of the important issues in the security equations of the Middle East. Damascus’s potential accession to the defense pact between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan has raised questions about Syria’s national sovereignty, military commitments and the future of its regional relations.
Ibrahim Al-Assil, a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Syria Project, a senior fellow with the Middle East Initiative at Harvard Kennedy School, and head of the Syria Transition Lab, wrote in an Atlantic Council commentary: In April 2025, I participated in a meeting in New York between Asaad al-Shaibani, Syria’s foreign minister, and members of the Syrian-American community. During the meeting, al-Shaibani indicated that Syria not only aspired to move beyond its own conflicts, but also wanted to be able to play a mediating role in other conflicts around the world. For a country ravaged by war and still under heavy sanctions at the time, this was a remarkable ambition. I left the meeting wondering whether Syria’s leadership would maintain this vision in the face of the region’s constantly shifting dynamics. Eighteen months later, during the Manama Dialogue, al-Shaibani announced that Syria was considering whether to join the Makkah alliance, a joint defense pact between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan.
While the two visions articulated in New York and Manama are not incompatible, the prospect of Syria joining this alliance raises two strategic questions: one for Syria and the other for the pact. For Syria, the question is whether joining the alliance would make the country safer and facilitate its transition. For the alliance, the question is whether admitting Syria would make it stronger. I believe the answer to both questions is no.
It is important for Syria to deepen its bilateral cooperation with the alliance’s members at all economic, military and security levels, but this does not require Damascus to join a formal alliance. Joining the alliance would expose Syria to a new set of threats. At the same time, admitting Syria to the alliance would mean accepting a member with vulnerable geography that is difficult to defend, increasing the potential for regional tensions to escalate for the alliance’s members.
Syria and the Makkah Alliance: A Security Opportunity or a Threat to Damascus’s Sovereignty?
Syria’s temptation is real. The fourteen-year conflict devastated the Syrian armed forces. In the first forty-eight hours after Bashar al-Assad’s fall, Israel carried out hundreds of airstrikes, destroying what remained of Syria’s air defenses. Repeated Israeli attacks on southern Syria, reports of arrests of Syrian civilians, and the new military posts Israel is building inside Syria have heightened Syrians’ sense of vulnerability and their desire to develop their own defensive capabilities. In late October, Jordanian airstrikes that killed civilians in southern Syria were something many Syrians described as an insult added to injury. In recent conversations I have had with Syrians, many expressed frustration at other countries’ violations of Syrian sovereignty and the Syrian government’s inability to protect its citizens.
For Syria’s leadership, joining the Makkah alliance could appear to offer a window of opportunity that would provide what Syria most desires: protection and recognition. It would demonstrate that Syria had succeeded in establishing an alliance with powerful actors, both for its own people and for regional actors. Membership in the alliance could provide Syria with a collective defense commitment from three regional powers, potentially deterring future attacks and giving Damascus greater confidence in its security.
Syria also needs to rebuild its military capabilities, including its air defenses and military institutions. Its growing relations with the alliance’s members offer opportunities for military cooperation, as well as diplomatic and economic support for reconstruction. Saudi Arabia has been an important supporter of Syria’s reintegration into the international community, and Damascus stands to benefit from strengthening this relationship.
After Israel’s airstrike on a Syrian air base in August, al-Shaibani rejected what he described as Israel’s attempt to interfere in Syria’s foreign-policy choices. Syria has the right to choose, but exercising that right does not mean entering into formal alliances. If Syria joins the alliance and Israel continues its pattern of attacks on Syria, the decision to respond to Israeli actions would shift from Damascus to Ankara, Riyadh and Islamabad. This would not help Syria restore its sovereignty; rather, it would structurally weaken it.
Expanding the Makkah Alliance: The Challenge of Defense Commitments and the Risk of Escalating Regional Tensions
The Mecca coalition is currently grappling with challenges of its own. Saudi Arabia is facing escalating tensions in Yemen and has an immediate interest in securing greater military support. For the coalition, expanding the pact would signal that the process is gaining momentum at a time when some analysts have raised doubts about its effectiveness and credibility. Turkey may see longer-term benefits in Syria joining the pact and in consolidating its strategic relationship with Damascus, which already includes military training, intelligence and operational support.
However, given Israel’s occupation of Syrian territory, admitting Syria at this juncture could portray the alliance as an anti-Israeli front. Syria’s admission would expand the alliance’s geography and serve as an essential component of the Saudi-Turkish corridor through Jordan. Yet this is a geography exposed to risk. If Syria were admitted while Israeli-Turkish tensions continued, it would likely become the alliance’s next test. If Israel or Iran attacked Syria, would Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan intervene to defend Syria and accept the risk of widening the conflict and opening new fronts? Or would they contain and undermine the alliance’s credibility? In this scenario, Syria could become an attractive target for testing the alliance without gaining reliable support.
Another important dimension is Syria’s potential role in Yemen. Reports indicate that Syria is considering providing military assistance to Saudi Arabia, although al-Shaibani recently denied that Syrian forces would be deployed to Yemen. Providing military support to Saudi Arabia could be one of the expectations placed on Syria if it joined the alliance. This would have significant implications. Syria is still consolidating its armed forces and establishing a unified command and an inclusive national army. Deploying forces to Yemen would disrupt this process and the country’s efforts to build institutions. Moreover, joining the war in Yemen could create expectations that the new Syria would join other countries’ wars, further complicating its relations with Israel.
Further reading: Turkey’s Defense Pacts: Instruments of Influence or Military Commitments?
Cooperation Without Membership: Syria’s Alternative Strategy for Reconstruction and Strengthening Security
The foregoing argument does not mean that Syria should distance itself from Saudi Arabia, Turkey or Pakistan. On the contrary, these relationships are important to Syria’s recovery. However, the benefits Syria can derive from its foreign relations do not require membership in a military alliance. Syria can pursue military training, intelligence-sharing, cooperation on border security and support for the development of defense capabilities through various forms of bilateral and multilateral relations, without committing to a military alliance that would provide neither the protection Syria seeks nor the power the alliance requires of it.
Pakistan, which has a long history of military training and intelligence cooperation with Syria, could also participate in rebuilding Syria’s armed forces and military institutions without Damascus needing to join the alliance. The defense cooperation agreement signed by Syria and Saudi Arabia on November 4 is an example of how such cooperation can advance without Syria joining the alliance. In the economic sphere, the Saudi Fund for Development has signed six grant-loan agreements worth more than $403 million to support reconstruction in sectors including energy, water, healthcare, housing and infrastructure.
Moreover, economic integration, investment, infrastructure development and trade corridors can advance through arrangements that do not require Syria to participate in or be exposed to regional wars. This formula would also benefit the alliance’s members. They could strengthen Syria without committing to its military defense or being drawn into a military confrontation inside Syria. This would serve the interests of all members and of the United States.
al-Shaibani’s vision of Syria’s participation in building peace beyond its borders deserves appreciation. Syria’s leadership should look beyond what Syria could gain from joining a military alliance and ask the broader question: What regional role does Syria want to play in the years ahead? Syria faces a generational task of rebuilding its state and society. Its decisions today regarding participation in regional conflicts could shape its foreign-policy expectations and commitments for years to come. Joining a military bloc could make it more difficult to achieve this vision, particularly if Syria became involved in other regional conflicts. Syria’s partners can support its recovery at the economic and security levels without involving Syria in an alliance that could place a heavy burden on its institutions and disrupt their development.
The region needs new ideas for how to build relations among its countries, including regional security cooperation without being obliged to participate in partners’ conflicts. This may seem out of reach, and that is precisely why it is needed more than ever.
Source: Atlantic Council
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